New Landmark Decision: European Commission Fines Delivery Hero and Glovo for Cartel Involving Labour Market Restrictions and Sensitive Information Exchange

Delivery Hero and Glovo are two of Europe’s leading online food delivery companies, arranging delivery of meals, groceries, and other retail products via app or website. Delivery Hero, headquartered in Germany, operates in over 70 countries worldwide (including 16 EEA countries), and is listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Glovo, based in Spain, operates in more than 20 countries (8 in the EEA). In July 2018, Delivery Hero acquired a minority (non-controlling) stake in Glovo and entered into a shareholders’ agreement with the company. Over the following years, Delivery Hero increased its shareholding, eventually acquiring full control of Glovo in July 2022.

Regulators uncovered that during the 2018–2022 period of cross-ownership, Delivery Hero and Glovo progressively replaced competition with coordination. The European Commission’s investigation began as an own-initiative inquiry into possible collusion in the food delivery sector, prompted by information from a national competition authority and an anonymous whistleblower tool. The Commission carried out unannounced inspections (dawn raids) at the companies’ premises in June 2022 and November 2023.

A formal antitrust proceeding was opened in July 2024 to examine the suspected no-poach and market-sharing agreements. Both Delivery Hero and Glovo ultimately chose to cooperate with the investigation and engage in a settlement procedure, expediting the case’s resolution.

The Commission found that, from July 2018 to July 2022, Delivery Hero and Glovo engaged in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. The anti-competitive practices were multifaceted, consisting of the following three main elements:

• No-Poach Agreements: The companies agreed not to solicit or hire each other’s employees. The 2018 shareholders’ agreement that accompanied Delivery Hero’s minority investment in Glovo initially contained limited reciprocal no-hire clauses for certain staff, which were later expanded into a general no-poaching pact covering all employees. This meant the two rivals ceased competing for talent, restricting job opportunities for workers.
• Exchange of Commercially Sensitive Information: Delivery Hero and Glovo shared confidential commercially sensitive data on matters such as pricing, business strategies, market capacity, costs, and product offerings. This information exchange allowed them to align their market conduct instead of competing, undermining the normal competitive process.
• Geographic Market Allocation: The companies allocated geographic markets between themselves. They agreed to avoid encroaching on each other’s core national markets and coordinated on expansion into new territories. In practice, they removed any overlapping operations and decided which company would enter markets where neither was yet present, effectively carving up the EEA food delivery market along national lines.

All of these arrangements were facilitated by Delivery Hero’s minority shareholding in Glovo. Owning a stake in a competitor is not illegal per se, but in this case the cross-shareholding enabled frequent high-level contacts and influence between the two companies.

Delivery Hero’s position as a significant minority investor gave it access to Glovo’s sensitive information and a degree of input into Glovo’s decisions, which helped align the firms’ business strategies. The Commission noted that this situation demonstrates how horizontal shareholdings in a rival can pose antitrust risks, if not handled carefully.

By substituting competition with coordination, Delivery Hero and Glovo’s agreement amounted to a cartel “by object”, meaning the very nature of the arrangements had the object of restricting competition. The Commission concluded that the no-hire pact, information sharing, and market division formed one continuous violation of Article 101 of the TFEU and, because the conduct extended to EEA countries outside the EU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. The cartel encompassed the entire EEA market and lasted for approximately four years, until Delivery Hero’s July 2022 takeover of Glovo effectively ended the companies’ separate market behaviour.

In its Decision, the Commission imposed a total fine of EURO 329 million on the two companies for the infringement. These fines were calculated under the Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on fines, taking into account the gravity and duration of the cartel, its wide EEA scope, the multi-faceted nature of the conduct, and variations in the cartel’s intensity over time. Both companies benefited from a 10% reduction in the fines by participating in the cartel settlement procedure, pursuant to the Commission’s 2008 Settlement Notice.

In a cartel settlement, the parties acknowledge their involvement and liability and accept a simplified procedure in exchange for a fine reduction. The Commission confirmed that Delivery Hero and Glovo admitted the infringement as described and agreed to settle, which streamlined the case’s resolution.

The Decision is historic for EU competition enforcement. For the first time, the Com-mission has explicitly recognised that restrictive labour market agreements - specifically, no-hire or no-poach clauses - can constitute a cartel infringement under Article 101 of the TFEU. By sanctioning the no-poach agreement, the Commission is affirming that arrangements to restrict hiring and talent mobility is just as illegal as price-fixing or customer allocation. This precedent is likely to spur greater scrutiny of employment-related arrangements (such as non-poaching or wage-fixing agreements) across industries, as regulators seek to ensure a fair labour market where companies compete for talent rather than collude to limit opportunities. Workers who were denied improved job opportunities due to such agreements are considered victims of the cartel’s effects, just as consumers would be in a price-fixing case. The substantial fines in this case serve as a stark reminder that the Commission will impose heavy penalties for arrangements that harms competition, whether it impacts customers or workers.

The Decision also breaks new ground by highlighting the antitrust risks of minority shareholdings in competitors. The Commission explicitly cautioned that even a partial equity stake in a rival can facilitate anti-competitive coordination if proper safeguards are not in place. This serves as a warning to companies and investors: strategic share-holdings or interlocking directorships among competitors must be handled with extreme care under EU competition law.

Finally, the Decision emphasises the importance of robust compliance programmes within companies. Businesses should therefore revisit their antitrust compliance training and internal policies to cover not just classic price-fixing or market-sharing, but also agreements affecting hiring and recruitment to ensure the non-existence of any of the unlawful practices established in the Decision. This is especially important when companies engage in partnerships, make minority investments, or consider mergers – any such dealings with competitors must be accompanied by clear firewalls and compliance safeguards to prevent illicit coordination.

From a legal standpoint, the Decision has direct consequences for potential damages claims against Delivery Hero and Glovo. Under EU and Danish law, any person or business harmed by the cartel (for example, restaurants or rival delivery services kept out of certain markets, or employees whose salaries, career prospects, etc. were affected by the cartel) can bring an action for damages in national courts. The Commission emphasized that its Decision is binding proof that the illegal conduct occurred, which greatly aids follow-on damage lawsuits. Notably, any civil damages awarded would not be reduced due to the fines already imposed by the Commission.

The Commission’s willingness to pursue novel theories of harm, particularly in the labour market, suggests that enforcement will intensify in this area. Businesses in all sectors should expect increased scrutiny of their employment practices, information exchanges, and market conduct.

National competition authorities are also likely to follow the Commission’s lead, in-creasing the risk of parallel investigations and enforcement actions.

Businesses should therefore review their internal policies, practices, and training in or-der to ensure the non-existence of any of the unlawful practices established in the Decision.